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Abstract 
In this paper we propose a model of how institutional benefits, taxation and government 
regulations affect the propensity of private firms to enter the unofficial economy. A 
central implication of the model is that profit-maximizing firms frequently will operate 
simultaneously in both the official and unofficial sectors. And contrary to a common view 
that high tax rates are intrinsically a major cause of large shadow economies, our model 
implies that the incentive of firms to produce underground and evade taxation depends on 
statutory tax rates relative to firmspecific thresholds of tax toleration. The concept of 
firm-specific tax toleration helps explain why tax evasion and underground production 
varies so greatly across enterprises operating in the same national institutional 
environment and facing the same regulations and tax rates. Some key predictions of the 
model concerning the determinants of firms’ tax toleration and the relative scale of their 
unofficial production receive broad support from empirical analyses of enterprise-level 
data from the World Bank’s World Business Environment Surveys. 
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1 Introduction
Unoﬃcial production of goods and services is a big deal — an activity en-
gaged in by millions of firms employing hundreds of millions of workers and
producing trillions of dollars of output internationally.1 The lion’s share
of research on the determinants of the scale of the unoﬃcial economy in-
vestigates cross-national patterns among aggregate economic and political-
institutional variables. The microeconomic mechanisms by which institu-
tions, policies and so forth influence the productive behavior of firms are
much less well documented and understood, though empirical studies based
on national aggregates sometimes draw inferences about the microeconomic
processes that might underlie the macroeconomic relationships uncovered.2
Our focus in this paper is explicitly on the productive activity of pri-
vate firms. We propose a model specifying how institutional benefits, tax-
ation and government regulations aﬀect a profit-maximizing firm’s optimal
production choices. Unlike models that have firms making ‘all or nothing’
choices about producing oﬃcially or unoﬃcially,3 a central prediction of
our model is that profit-maximizing firms frequently will operate simulta-
neously in both the oﬃcial and unoﬃcial sectors.4 Moreover, contrary to a
traditional view that high tax rates are intrinsically a major cause of large
shadow economies, our model implies that the incentive of firms to produce
1For our purposes unoﬃcial economic activity is defined by production and sale of goods
and services that evade oﬃcial registration and taxation. Such activity is undertaken
either by firms that are not registered oﬃcially, or by firms that are registered oﬃcially
but produce and sell at least part of their output unoﬃcially. Common labels used in
place of ‘unoﬃcial’ are hidden, parallel, underground, shadow, clandestine, black, and
unobserved. Schneider and Enste (2000) and Schneider and Enste (2002) are leading recent
studies providing detailed discussion of various definitions of the concept and estimates of
aggregate national magnitudes.
2Loayza (1996), Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer (1997), Johnson, Kaufmann, and
Zoido-Lobaton (1998), Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobaton (2000) are im-
portant examples of research investigating model-derived relationships among government
policies, institutions and the underground economy with empirical data for country aggre-
gates. Johnson, Kaufmann, McMillan, and Woodruﬀ (2000) investigates similar empirical
relationships in firm-level data for five East European transition countries without refer-
ence to an explicit model.
3 In Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer (1997), for example, the quality of institutions
and governance drive firms into an activity equilibrium allowing only one of two stable
states: totally oﬃcial and totally unoﬃcial.
4Firm-level interview data indicate that simultaneous activity is commonplace. In the
World Bank’s WBES (2000) data that we use for empirical analyses in section 3, responses
from an international sample of firm managers indicate that more than 60% of registered
enterprises produce both oﬃcial and unoﬃcial output.
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underground and evade taxation depends on statutory tax rates relative to
firm-specific thresholds of tax toleration. The concept of firm-specific tax
toleration thresholds helps explain why tax evasion and underground pro-
duction varies so greatly across enterprises operating in the same national
institutional environment and facing the same regulations and tax rates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we define the
production setting of profit maximizing firms that optimally allocate labor
and capital to oﬃcial production, unoﬃcial production, or both. Oﬃcial
production is subject to taxes and regulations, but it benefits from institu-
tional services unavailable to underground producers. Unoﬃcial production
on the other hand escapes regulations and taxation of profits and labor, but
it requires firms to bribe enforcement authorities who aim to maximize their
own income from public employment and bribes, subject to the likelihood
of being discovered selling corruption and suﬀering the penalties associated
therewith. We derive in this setting the circumstances under which the firm
will undertake at least some of its production in the underground economy
and evade taxes. A central condition is that statutory tax rates exceed
firm-specific thresholds of tax toleration, where toleration thresholds are
determined, among other things, by firm-specific institutional benefits avail-
able only when producing oﬃcially and the costs of corruption required to
produce unoﬃcially. The remainder of section 2 illustrates graphically some
implications of the model for the responses of a firm’s oﬃcial, unoﬃcial and
total output to changes in tax rates and changes in levels of tax toleration
induced by shifts in exogenous demand- and supply-side variables.
In section 3 we test some key predications of the model concerning the
determinants of firms’ tax toleration and tax evasion. Test regressions are
based on recent interview data for 3818 enterprises distributed over 54 coun-
tries obtained from the World Bank’s World Business Environment Surveys
(WBES). Both structural and reduced form regression experiments yield
broad support of the model’s testable implications. In section 4 we present
some concluding observations about the policy implications of our theory
and evidence.
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2 The Setting
We consider private firms with exogenously given, fixed endowments of cap-
ital, K, and variable labor requirements in two sectors of production: Lo,
denoting labor employed in oﬃcial production, and Lu, denoting labor em-
ployed in unoﬃcial production. We assume that the wage, w, is identical
in the two sectors, but that labor cost in the oﬃcial sector is (1 + tw) · w,
where the labor tax rate tw subsumes the formal payroll tax rate, tL, and
regulations on oﬃcially employed labor, RL, imposing costs that are func-
tionally equivalent to conventional labor taxes. k denotes the fraction of its
capital that the firm allocates to oﬃcial production, and (1− k) is the frac-
tion allocated to unoﬃcial production.5 A firm’s oﬃcial output, yo, which
is legally declared and subject to taxation, is determined by the following
technology:
(1) yo = Bδ
¡
kK
¢α Lβo , α+ β + δ = 1 α, β, δ > 0
where B denotes the productive value of institutional services available only
to oﬃcial activity, such as contract enforcement by courts, police protection
of property, customs services and oﬃcial banking services.6 We assume that
B depends on firm-specific attributes (for example, size, area of activity,
complexity of legal organization, managerial sophistication),7 and country-
specific availability of institutional services of given quality supporting of-
ficial production. Hence even among firms with high need of institutional
services owing to their characteristics, inputs of B may be low because of
bureaucratic impediments to supply and generic deficiencies of national ca-
5Hence the model abstracts from capital accumulation and each firm’s allocation of
its capital endowment K reveals its disposition to produce in the oﬃcial and unoﬃcial
economy.
6Note that our concept of institutional services exclusively supporting oﬃcial produc-
tion excludes government financed infrastructure and other public goods available to both
oﬃcial and unoﬃcial productive activity. For simplicity we assume there are no ‘user
costs’ attached to B; providing for them would add little to the formal analysis.
7The assumption that firms diﬀer with respect to their need for and use of institutional
services is consistent with some existing firm-level empirical evidence. For example, in
their analysis of enterprises in transition economies Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruﬀ
(2002) found that court enforcement of contracts is more important to firms establishing
new business relationships than to established firms, and is more important to industries
with a relatively low specificity of investments. Data presented in Batra, Kaufmann,
and Stone (2002) indicate that small firms by comparison to medium and large firms are
less constrained by customs procedures, whereas small- and medium-sized firms are more
constrained than large ones by access to oﬃcial banking institutions.
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pacity.
The production of unoﬃcial, untaxed output, yu, can take no benefit of
oﬃcial institutional services. Moreover, in order to employ capital and labor
in the underground economy and avoid confiscation of unoﬃcial output by
omniscient bureaucrats, and also in order to obtain extra-legally services
replicating those supplied by oﬃcial institutions, firms pursuing shadow op-
erations must engage in corrupt transactions with enforcement oﬃcials —
tax authorities, customs agents, construction site inspectors, the police and
so forth.8 Inputs of bureaucratic corruption are therefore necessary for a
firm to produce and market unoﬃcial output. We denote the quantity of
illegal favors and services by units of “C”.9 The production technology of
the unoﬃcial sector takes the same functional form as that of the oﬃcial
sector, and it has identical parameters of productivity:
(2) yu = Cδ
¡
(1− k)K
¢α Lβu.
A profit maximizing firm needs to decide how much labor to employ in
the two sectors,10 how to distribute its capital stock between them, and how
much corruption to buy from corruptible bureaucrats.11 The firm solves the
problem
(3)
max
k,Lo,Lu,C
π = (1− t) [yo − (1 + tw)wLo] + [yu − wLu −mC]
s.t. 0 ≤ k ≤ 1; C,Lo, Lu ≥ 0
8The productive activity we model is not “criminal” in the sense that it would be legal
if undertaken in the oﬃcial, taxed economy. In other words, we are not dealing with
activities generally treated as criminally illegal (and frequently controlled by criminal
organizations), such as the drug trade, smuggling, prostitution and the like.
9Hence by contrast to some previous studies that view corruption and bribery as forces
driving firms out of oﬃcial production into the underground economy (for example Choi
and Thum (2005), Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer (1997) and Friedman, Johnson, Kauf-
mann, and Zoido-Lobaton (2000)), equation (2) is based on the idea that the ‘grabbing
hands’ of corrupt bureaucrats alternatively serve as ‘helping hands’ allowing firms to ex-
ploit profitable opportunities in the unoﬃcial economy.
10We assume firms may allocate labor freely between oﬃcial and unoﬃcial activity.
Treating labor as a passive resource is of course an abstraction from the real world in which
workers as well as firms face incentives and disincentives to participate in the underground
economy.
11Firms producing oﬃcially may also pay bribes to obtain or to speed up delivery of
B from recalcitrant government authorities. (See Shleifer and Vishny (1993).) In this
paper, however, we confine attention to the corruption and bribery necessary for a firm to
produce in the underground economy. The pathbreaking study of Peru by De Soto (1989)
found that bribe payments by unoﬃcial businesses vastly exceeded those made by oﬃcial
businesses.
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where m denotes the unit price of C, and the tax rate t subsumes the formal
profit tax rate, tF , and regulatory burdens on oﬃcial activity, RF , that are
analogous to taxes.
2.1 The Bureaucrat’s Problem
Corruption is priced by a representative public oﬃcial (a ‘bureaucrat’) who
is responsible for enforcing the tax code and other regulations. We assume
the enforcement bureaucrat is able to accurately detect a firm’s unoﬃcial
activity, but is willing to overlook it if compensated suﬃciently by illegal
payments.12 The bureaucrat receives a salary equal to S. If involved in
corrupt transactions and not caught, the bureaucrat enjoys additional in-
come from bribes equal to m · C. If discovered to be selling corruption, the
bureaucrat loses employment and pays a fixed penalty P . The bureaucrat’s
expected income, E (yb) , then is:
(4) E (yb) = θ (S +mC)− (1− θ)P
where (1− θ) is the probability that the bureaucrat is discovered to be selling
C.
The probability θ is determined by an exogenous mechanism exposing
corruption
(5) θ = e−μC , μ > 0
where μ indexes the eﬀectiveness of exposure procedures at given C which
is assumed to vary with firm-specific characteristics aﬀecting the ‘visibility’
of transactions in the corruption market.13 Note that
∂θ
∂C
= −μe−μC < 0,
so that the more units of corruption sold by the bureaucrat, the higher the
chances (1− θ) of being caught and penalized. However if the exposure
mechanism is weak (μ is small), the probability of being caught tends to be
small, even when C is big.
The bureaucrat’s problem is to set a price m per unit of corruption that
12The setup below has elements in common with the rich, more complex model of
Mookherjee and Png (1995) which is oriented to firms that pay bribes in order to evade
pollution regulations.
13The most important characteristics aﬀecting visibility are likely to be aspects of firm
size — for example, the magnitudes of the firm’s capital stock K and its labor force L.
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maximizes expected income (4), subject to (5) and taking the firm’s demand
for corruption as given. The optimal solution to the bureaucrat’s problem
yields the supply relation14
(6) m =
μ (S + P )
1− μC .
Equation (6) implies that enforcement bureaucrats will supply corruption
and overlook tax evasion only if firms accept a unit price m higher than a
minimum defined by m = μ (S + P ). The minimum price m rises as the
bureaucrat’s salary S increases, as the mechanism for exposing corruption
becomes more eﬀective (as μ increases), and as punishment becomes more
stringent (as P increases). In other words, the higher are μ, S, and P ,
the more costly it is to induce bureaucrats to supply corruption. And the
greater is the demand for corruption, the higher is the unit price of C set by
bureaucrats at given risks of exposure and punishment. Equation (6) also
implies that a finite positive equilibrium price for corruption can exist only
when C <
1
μ
, reinforcing the point that the less eﬀective are procedures for
detecting corruption, the less constrained is its supply from the bureaucracy,
and the higher is the likelihood that a market for corruption will exist.15
2.2 Tax Evasion and the Existence of a Corruption Market
Assume that the firm has perfect information about the bureaucrat’s sup-
ply schedule in (6). For given positive values B, t, tw, μ, S, and P , the
firm’s maximization program in eq. (3) admits two solutions: (1) an in-
terior solution where the firm allocates capital and labor to both oﬃcial
and unoﬃcial production, and (2) a corner solution where labor and capital
are allocated wholly to oﬃcial production. In the first case the firm enters
into corrupt transactions with bureaucrats in order to protect its unoﬃcial
output, whereas in the second the firm has no incentive to evade taxes and
14Proofs of all results asserted in the paper are given in an Appendix of Proofs available
by request to the authors or at Douglas Hibbs’s website: www.douglas-hibbs.com.
15Complicit firms are not directly punished if enforcement authorities are discovered
selling corruption because profit from unoﬃcial production in (3) is not aﬀected directly by
the exposure probability (1− θ). Modifying the profit function to include penalties levied
on buyers as well as sellers of corruption yields analytical results qualitatively similar to
those discussed, but the comparative statics are enormously more complicated. Exposure
eﬀectiveness, however, indirectly depresses unoﬃcial profit via the positive eﬀect of μ on
the price of corruption m.
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produce unoﬃcially, and thus has no need of C.16 We consider the two cases
sequentially.
When the firm finds it optimal to produce in both sectors simultaneously,
the profit maximizing levels of output are:
(7) yo =
µ
Bm
δ
¶
(1− t)
α
δ
µ
1
1 + tw
¶β
δ
(8) yu =
µ
δ
m
¶ δ
α
µ
β
w
¶ β
α
(1− k)K
where the share of capital allocated to oﬃcial production is
k =
(1− t)
α+δ
δ B
³
1
1+tw
´β
δ
¡ δ
m
¢α+δ
α K
³
β
w
´ β
α
.
Intuitively, equations (7)-(8) can be interpreted as saying that the firm
decides how much output to produce in the two sectors by first determining
the maximum output it could produce in the unoﬃcial sector where it avoids
taxes on profits and labor. Setting k = 0 on the right-side of (8) gives
notional maximum unoﬃcial output as yumax =
µ
δ
m
¶ δ
α
µ
β
w
¶ β
α
K. The
firm then implicitly trades oﬀ part of yumax for taxable output yo up to
the point where institutional benefits to oﬃcial production compensate the
firm for the tax liabilities incurred by producing oﬃcially. It follows that
the firm will find it profitable to operate unoﬃcially (k < 1 and yu > 0)
only if
(9)
µ
δ
m
¶α+δ
α
µ
β
w
¶ β
α
K > (1− t)
α+δ
δ
µ
1
1 + tw
¶β
δ
B.
For a given capital stock K, condition (9) indicates that the firm engages in
tax evasion when cheap corruption and a low wage level in the underground
sector combine with high profit taxation, high non-wage costs on oﬃcially
16The third hypothetical possibility in which the firm operates wholly in the unoﬃcial
sector emerges only in the fanciful case of confiscatory taxation (t = 1), or more real-
istically when oﬃcial institutional services are either not needed by the firm or are not
provided to any meaningful extent by government (B = 0).
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employed labor and deficient institutional services in the oﬃcial sector.
Recall from the analysis of the bureaucrat’s problem that a positive sup-
ply of corruption requires m to be above the minimum price m = μ (S + P ).
The firm, on the other hand, will be willing to pay bribes and purchase C
only if it is active in the unoﬃcial sector (yu > 0), which by (9) requires
that
(10) m < δ
µ
K
B
¶ α
α+δ
µ
β
w
¶ β
(α+δ)
(1− t)−
α
δ (1 + tw)
βα
δ(α+δ) .
The right-side of (10) therefore defines the upper bound of C’s unit price,
which we denote m. Corrupt transactions between firms and bureaucrats
will exist only if m < m, that is only if
(11) μ (S + P ) < δ
µ
K
B
¶ α
α+δ
µ
β
w
¶ β
(α+δ)
(1− t)−
α
δ (1 + tw)
βα
δ(α+δ) .
When (11) holds, firms and enforcement bureaucrats will agree on a unique
price for units of C, and an active corruption market enabling unoﬃcial
production will exist.
The firm’s demand for corruption, implied by the first order condition
for C in (3), is
(12) C =
µ
δ
m
¶α+δ
α
µ
β
w
¶ β
α
(1− k)K
where recall that k is a positive function of m and w and a negative function
of t, tw and K (see eq. 8). Figure 1 uses sensible values of terms in the
corruption demand and supply functions (eqs. 12 and 6) to illustrate that
a unique equilibrium (m∗, C∗) exists in the admissible range (m, m).17
17A more formal demonstration runs as follows. The optimal relation (6) implies the sup-
ply function CS (m) = m−μ(S+P )μm . Eq. (12) gives demand as C
D (m) =
? δ
m
?α+δ
α
? β
w
? β
α (1−
k)K. As illustrated in Figure 1, at CS (m) = 0, CS (m) < CD (m), and at CD (m) = 0,
CD (m) < CS (m). Since CS (m) is monotonically increasing inm and CD (m) is monoton-
ically decreasing inm, it follows that there exists a unique value m∗ in the interval (m, m)
such that CS (m∗) = CD (m∗). Therefore, when the maximum unit price the firm is will-
ing to pay for C is higher than the minimum unit price the bureaucrat is willing to accept,
they will always find a price m∗ they can agree upon. When condition (11) does not hold,
then m > m and the firm will not purchase corruption required to produce unoﬃcially and
evade taxes. Consequently, there will be no transactions for C and a corruption market
will not exist. The conventional price-quantity axes in Figure 1 are interchanged because
9
m- m
- m
C
Hm*,C*L
Eq. H12L
Eq. H6L
Figure 1: Equilibrium Price of Corruption. When the firm is willing to pay
a price per unit of C exceeding the minimum price m acceptable to enforcement
bureaucrats, a market for corruption will exist with equilibrium (m∗, C∗).
2.3 Tax Toleration and Tax Evasion
In addition to defining conditions for the existence of a corruption market,
eq. (11) has important implications for the impact of profit taxation on
the scale of the underground economy and tax evasion. Solving (11) for
the profit tax rate on the left-side shows that unoﬃcial production emerges
when
(13)
t > t
t ≡ 1−
µ
δ
μ (S + P )
¶ δ
α ³
K
B
´ δ
α+δ
µ
β
w
¶ βδ
α(α+δ)
(1 + tw)
β
α+δ .
We interpret t as identifying the firm’s threshold of tax toleration. What
matters for a firm’s optimal production strategy is not the absolute rate of
profit taxation, but instead the magnitude of t relative to the rate that firms’
perceive to be “worth paying” in light of institutional benefits enjoyed only
in the oﬃcial sector and the cost of corruption required to produce in the un-
oﬃcial sector. In terms of variables amenable to policy influence, (13) says
the forgoing argument is somewhat easier to interpret from the graph lines when C is on
vertical axis and m on the horizontal.
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that tax toleration increases with firm-specific institutional benefits B, and
with corruption prices m, which in turn are determined by firm-specific ef-
fectiveness of corruption exposure μ and nation-specific bureaucratic salaries
plus penalties S + P . On the other hand, toleration of taxation falls as the
relative price of labor facing firms producing oﬃcially (1 + tw) rises.
When the profit tax rate experienced by a firm is below its toleration
threshold, the benefits of tax evasion in the underground economy are out-
weighed by a combination of the cost of corruption necessary to produce
unoﬃcially, and profitable opportunities in the taxable sector where pro-
duction takes benefit of oﬃcial institutional services. Consequently when
t ≤t, unoﬃcial production and corruption are nil, and all production is of-
ficial. Formally, this case represents a corner solution to the firm’s problem
in (3) with k = 1, yu = 0 and C = 0. Total output at the corner is
(14) yo = B
δ
α+δK
α
α+δ
µ
β
(1 + tw)w
¶ β
α+δ
.
An implication of the equilibrium results is that it is possible for govern-
ment to impose high rates of profit tax without triggering large diversions
of resources to underground production and large scale tax evasion if the
authorities are able to raise B, μ, S and P enough to create even higher
thresholds of tax toleration.
Figure 2 illustrates the pattern of firms’ production choices as the profit
tax rate t varies around a fixed threshold of tax toleration t. The constituents
of t (the profit tax rate proper, tF , and regulations on oﬃcial producers,
RF ) are of course core policy instruments in any national political economy.
Total output (ytotal) in the Figure cumulates production in the oﬃcial and
unoﬃcial sectors.
In the graph region where t < t (to the left of t on the horizontal axis),
all production is oﬃcial. As implied by (13) ytotal = yo. As t rises above the
threshold t, firms begin to find activity in the underground sector profitable
and they produce yo and yu simultaneously. The response of production
decisions to increases of the profit tax rate among firms perceiving t > t
and, consequently, already evading taxes to some degree, is composed of
direct and indirect eﬀects. Tax rate hikes directly depress marginal returns
on labor and capital in the oﬃcial sector, which by itself prompts firms to
shift resources to the unoﬃcial sector — k falls and so yu rises (eq. 8). Higher
11
t
—
1
t
y
ytotal
yo
yu
Figure 2: Optimal Output Levels as the Profit Tax Rate Varies. Oﬃcial
output yo decreases and unoﬃcial output yu increases monotonically as the tax
rate t rises above the firm’s tax toleration threshold t. Consequently the oﬃcial
output share yo/(yo+yu) decreases, but the firm’s total output ytotal = (yo+yu)
may expand or contract, depending on the initial condition of t. At t < t all
production is oﬃcial, and at t = 1 all production is unoﬃcial.
production in the underground economy, however, requires bigger inputs of
corruption, and the associated upward shift in demand for C prompts an
upward adjustment of the price m (eq. 6) muting the increase in unoﬃcial
activity ultimately induced by a higher t (eqs. 7-8).18 Nonetheless, in the
range t > t, higher tax rates unambiguously lead to equilibrium increases
of yu and decreases of yo and, therefore, to decreases in the share of oﬃcial
output in total production.19
The eﬀect of changes to profit tax rates on total output, ytotal = yo+yu,
depends on t’s initial condition. As suggested by Figure 2, in the range
t >> t an increase in t induces a decline in oﬃcial output that more than
oﬀsets the corresponding rise of unoﬃcial output, thereby contracting the
18 In other words, the impact of tax rate changes on firm’s output decisions would
be stronger, and the equilibrium level of corruption would be higher, in the absence of
interactions in the corruption market between firms and bureaucrats over the price of C
that yield adjustments of m to shifts in the demand for corruption.
19Formally, for any t >t it can be shown that ∂ lnm∂ ln t > 0,
∂ lnC
∂ ln t > 0,
∂ ln yo
∂ ln t < 0,
∂ ln yu
∂ ln t > 0 and
∂ ln
?
yo
yo+yu
?
∂ ln t < 0. More detailed analysis of the comparative statics appears
in the Appendix of Proofs.
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firm’s aggregate production.20 The underlying reason is that when profit
tax rates are relatively high, firms tend to be heavily engaged in unoﬃcial
production and to be paying high prices for the big quantities of corrup-
tion required to sustain the large scale of underground operations. As a
result, increases to already high tax rates yield only modest expansions of
unoﬃcial activity, and these are more than oﬀset by contractions of oﬃcial
output. Hence total output declines. At lower initial tax rates, however, the
firm’s aggregate output may well increase due to increases of profit taxation
because the tax-induced expansion of unoﬃcial production exceeds the as-
sociated tax-induced contraction of oﬃcial production.21 The implications
of those patterns among firms for international patterns in macroeconomic
performance depend on how firms are distributed across countries vis-à-vis
national rates of profit tax t in relation to firm-specific levels of tax toleration
t.
2.4 Demand- and Supply-Side Determinants of Toleration
and Evasion
We next evaluate how movements in tax toleration aﬀect firms’ output de-
cisions. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the eﬀects of changes in tax toleration
originating with an increase to institutional services, B, and with an in-
crease to the eﬀectiveness of corruption exposure, μ, respectively. Recall
that B is a principal determinant of the demand for corruption, whereas μ
is a key variable aﬀecting the supply side of the corruption market. Along
with the demand-side variable tw and the supply-side variables S and P ,
the availability and quality of institutional services and the eﬀectiveness of
corruption detection are potential policy instruments that could be used by
national authorities to influence tax toleration, and through that route the
scale of tax evasion and underground production.
Figure 3 illustrates how firms’ profitable production possibilities shift
owing to an exogenous increase in B raising tax toleration from t0 to t1.
The enhancement of B induces all firms to increase oﬃcial output (eqs. 7
20Specifically, ∂ ln(yo+yu)∂ ln t < 0 if t >
δ
α+δ (1− Cμ).
21Note that results here and ahead assume firms do not internalize potential feedback
from increased oﬃcial production to higher government tax revenues, which in turn might
finance lower tax rates or improved institutional benefits aﬀecting oﬃcial production. The
impact of an individual firm’s production choices on government resources is negligible and
so potential feedback eﬀects rationally would be disregarded in optimal decision making.
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and 14). Moreover, firms initially operating to some degree in the under-
ground economy whose tax toleration threshold is pushed above the profit
tax rate by improvement to institutional services (firms with t0 < t <t1)
will cease producing in the shadow economy. Firms active from the start
in the unoﬃcial sector whose new toleration threshold remains below the
profit tax rate (firms with t0 <t1 < t) will continue operating unoﬃcially,
but will reallocate some resources out of underground production to oﬃcial
production. Hence both oﬃcial output yo and the share of oﬃcial output in
total output yoyo+yu increase as B rises. And although corruption prices m
will adjust downward in response to the across-the-board decline in demand
for corruption, in equilibrium both the level and the price of corruption will
be lower in the wake of the expansion among all firms of both oﬃcial and
total production.22
t1
—
t0
—
1
t
y
ytotal
yo
yu
Figure 3: Output Eﬀects of an Improvement to Institutional Benefits B. An
increase in B raises the firm’s threshold of tax toleration from t0 to t1. Optimal
production decisions under t1 are shown by the black graph lines and under t0 by
the grey graph lines. At any given tax rate t, the rise in t prompts the firm to
produce more oﬃcial output yo, and less unoﬃcial output yu. The increase of yo
always exceeds the decrease of yu, and so total output ytotal rises along with the
oﬃcial output share yo/(yo + yu).
Figure 4 illustrates the output eﬀects of an exogenous increase in the
22Formally, it can be shown that ∂ lnC∂ lnB < 0,
∂ lnm
∂ lnB < 0,
∂ ln yu
∂ lnB < 0,
∂ ln yo
∂ lnB > 0,
∂ ln(yo+yu)
∂ lnB > 0 and .
∂ ln
?
yo
yo+yu
?
∂ ln t > 0. Changes to tw yield the same pattern of eﬀects
but with opposite signs.
14
eﬀectiveness of the corruption exposure mechanism μ that raises the firm’s
threshold of tax toleration from t0 to t1. An increase in μ contracts the
supply of corruption, which induces higher oﬃcial production and lower un-
oﬃcial production among all firms with initial condition t > t. By contrast
to B, however, μ is not a factor of production, and it therefore exerts no
influence on the output decisions of firms with initial condition t < t, that
is firms initially active wholly in the oﬃcial economy. In this sense the car-
rot of improved institutions has wider impact than the stick of improved
detection of corruption because the former aﬀects the behavior of all firms.
Moreover, unlike the case of improvements to institutional benefits which
always raise total as well as oﬃcial production, improved detection of cor-
ruption does not yield higher total output because the ensuing decline of the
firm’s unoﬃcial output exceeds the growth of its oﬃcial output. Intuitively,
the explanation of this result may be described by the following sequence of
events. The heightened probability of being caught and punished for sell-
ing corruption brought about by an increase to μ leads income-maximizing
enforcement bureaucrats to require higher unit prices m to supply given
quantities of corruption. More expensive corruption reduces firms’ demand
for inputs of C necessary to produce unoﬃcially without aﬀecting the mar-
ginal products of inputs to oﬃcial production. With lower unoﬃcial pro-
duction and higher exposure probability, the equilibrium level of corruption
decreases and its equilibrium price increases. In the new environment firms
will tend to transfer some of their resources to the oﬃcial sector, but only
to the extent that additional oﬃcial profits compensate for the unoﬃcial
profits forgone due to higher costs of corruption. Firms that in the first
instance were evading taxes will sometimes even find it profitable to exit
the underground economy completely (firms with t0 < t <t1). Yet like firms
that remain to some degree in the underground economy under t1, the ex-
pansion of oﬃcial production among exiting firms will not fully compensate
for loss of unoﬃcial output. Consequently, among firms initially located in
the range t > t, increases to μ yield rises in the oﬃcial share of output but
declines in aggregate output.23
23More precisely, as shown in the Appendix of Proofs, even though an increase in μ has
positive eﬀect on a tax evading firm’s oﬃcial production, ∂ ln yo∂ lnμ > 0, and on its oﬃcial
share of total production,
∂ ln
?
yo
yo+yu
?
∂ lnμ > 0, the eﬀect on its total output is negative,
∂ ln(yo+yu)
∂ lnμ < 0. The eﬀects of changes in S and P are qualitatively the same.
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Figure 4: Output Eﬀects of an Increase in Corruption Exposure Eﬀectiveness
μ. An increase in μ raises the firm’s threshold of tax toleration from t0 to t1.
Optimal production decisions under t1 are shown by the black graph lines and
under t0 by the grey graph lines. The increase of tax toleration induced by higher
μ prompts less unoﬃcial and more oﬃcial production among firms with t > t.
However the decline of yu is bigger than the rise of yo, and so although the oﬃcial
output share yo/(yo + yu) rises, total output ytotal falls. The productive activity
of firms with t < t is unaﬀected by changes in μ.
In the next section we take the model to data and test some of its main
implications concerning determinants of tax toleration and the relative scale
of tax evasion and unoﬃcial production.
3 Some Empirical Evidence
From late 1998 to mid-2000 the World Bank sponsored interviews with man-
agers of more than 10,000 enterprises in 80 countries covering the main re-
gions of the world — The World Business Environment Surveys (“WBES
2000”).24 The interviews dealt, among other things, with managers’ percep-
tions of the operational diﬃculties posed by taxation, government regula-
tions, corruption of public oﬃcials, functioning of the judiciary, and access
to financial services. The surveys also obtained reports about the degree of
tax evasion among firms. These WBES data make possible rough empirical
tests of key implications of our model concerning (i) direct determinants of
24For detailed information about the surveys see Batra, Kaufmann, and Stone (2002).
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firm-level toleration of taxation, and (ii) direct and indirect determinants of
the relative scale of unoﬃcial production and tax evasion.
Empirical analyses were undertaken for a subset of the enterprises sam-
pled. First, because the model pertains to the behavior of private firms, we
excluded the public sector firms surveyed. Second, we excluded enterprises
in African countries because in that region the data were obtained predomi-
nately from mail surveys, rather than from in-person interviews which were
undertaken everywhere else. We regard the postal survey data as far less
reliable than the personal interview data.25 Finally, the usable sample was
reduced further due to missing data for one or more variables in our mul-
tivariate analyses. Sample attrition from this source included all Middle
Eastern countries. All tolled, the regression experiments presented ahead
are based on a common sample of personal interview responses from man-
agers of 3818 firms distributed over 54 countries.
3.1 Toleration of Taxation
The main message of our model is that the scale of unoﬃcial production
and tax evasion are driven by the gap between a firm’s profit tax rate t
and threshold of tax toleration t. Let i be an index for firms and j an
index for countries. Because the profit tax rate subsumes conventional
country-level rates, tFj , and regulations on oﬃcial activity which generally
impact individual firms in diﬀerent ways, RFij , we have firm-specific profit
tax rates tij = t
h
tFj , R
F
ij
i
. Similarly, because the labor tax rate subsumes
conventional national payroll rates, tLj , and labor regulations which gener-
ally aﬀect firms in diﬀerent ways, RLij , we have firm-specific labor tax rates
twij = tw
h
tLj , R
L
ij
i
.
The definition of tij in (13) shows that tax toleration is aﬀected posi-
tively by institutional benefits, Bij , which vary over firms in every country,
negatively by payroll tax rates, twij , which vary over firms in every country,
and positively by corruption price minima mij = μij (Sj + Pj), which vary
over firms (owing to firm-specific visibility eﬀects embodied in the detec-
tion parameter μij) in various countries (owing to national salary levels Sj
and malfeasance penalties Pj). The model also implies that a firm’s capital
stock Kij directly decreases tij . At the same time Kij most likely increases
25Among other problems, the African postal surveys yielded very low response rates
and implausibly low reports of tax evasion.
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tij indirectly by aﬀecting positively the visibility of corruption (operating
through μij) and wage levels wij — particularly since our calibration of cor-
ruption prices is weak and we are unable to measure wage levels at all.26
(See ahead.) The functional relations are therefore
(15) tij = F
"
+
Bij ,
−
twij ,
+¡
μij , Sj , Pj
¢
,
+/−
Kij
#
where the expected sign of F 0 (·) appears above each term on the right-side
of (15).
We measure thresholds of tax toleration, tij , by answers to the follow-
ing WBES question: “Please judge on a four point scale how problematic
are high taxes for the operation and growth of your business” with ordered
response categories 1 =‘major obstacle’, 2= ‘moderate obstacle’, 3=‘minor
obstacle’, and 4 = ‘no obstacle’.27 We assume these data yield ordinal mea-
surement of an underlying continuum running from low to high values of
tax toleration.
Institutional benefits available to firms producing oﬃcially, Bij , are mea-
sured by responses to the WBES question “Please judge on a four point scale
how problematic are these diﬀerent regulatory areas for the operation and
growth of your business” for items pertaining to access to financial services,
functioning of the judicial system, and customs procedures. The surveys
supplied four response options for each item, which again run from 1 =
‘major obstacle’ to 4 = ‘no obstacle’. We constructed a composite index
of Bij by taking the arithmetic average of the rating codes across the three
items.28
A composite measure of regulatory burdens imposed on firms’ oﬃcial
activities, RFij , which are analogous to conventional profit taxes, was con-
structed in the same way as the variable for institutional benefits by using
responses to the above question for items dealing with problems concern-
ing business licensing, environmental regulations, fire and safety regulations,
26Positive influence ofK on w would represent so-called eﬃciency wage eﬀects associated
with large, capital rich firms.
27The percentage of responses falling in each category 1 to 4 were 59%, 21%, 11% and
9%, respectively.
28We also generated a composite score for B using the first principal component of the
survery items, but empirical results obtained using this approach were not appreciably
diﬀerent from those obtained using averages.
18
and foreign exchange regulations. Regulations of oﬃcially employed labor,
RLij , which are akin to conventional payroll taxes, were measured by re-
sponses to the same question pertaining to problems with government labor
regulations.
The capital endowment of firms, Kij , is measured by responses to the
WBES question that asked managers to “estimate your firm’s fixed assets
(land, buildings, equipment)”. The surveys provided eleven response cat-
egories ranging from less than 250,000 USD to 500,000,000 USD or more.
Though truncated at the upper end, these data supply good calibration of
capital stocks.
The WBES data provide much weaker empirical referents for mij =
μij (Sj + Pj) — the minimum price of corruption necessary to induce tax
oﬃcials to overlook unoﬃcial production and tax evasion among firms in
various countries.29 The best proxy of that concept available in the WBES
are reports about the frequency of bribery. Specifically, enterprise managers
were asked “Thinking about government oﬃcials, is it common for firms in
your line of business to have to pay some irregular ‘additional payments’ to
get things done” with ordered response categories ranging from 1 = ‘always’
to 6 = ‘never’.30 We take the minimum price of corruption faced by firms
to be proportional to the response codes for this question. In other words
we assume that the bribe frequency data reflect underlying firm-specific
prices determining enforcement oﬃcials’ willingness to engage in corrupt
transactions.
Our indirect calibration of the forces underlying corruption prices from
the irregular ‘additional payments’ responses has obvious deficiencies. First,
we do not observe any of the direct determinants specified by the model —
namely, firm-specific eﬀectiveness of corruption detection in various coun-
tries, μij , or the salaries received by and penalties imposed upon enforcement
bureaucrats in various countries, Sj and Pj . Second, the available survey
question pertains to illegal payments associated with all corrupt deals be-
tween firms and government oﬃcials, not only to bribes paid to make possi-
ble production in the unoﬃcial economy, which is the object of our model.
29The same measurement deficiencies of course apply to other combinations of μij , Sj ,
and Pj that aﬀect equilibrium corruption prices and sectoral output decisions and output
shares. See the discussion ahead.
30The intervening response options scored from 2 to 5 were mostly, frequently, some-
times, and seldom.
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Firms of course may pay bribes not only to engage in unoﬃcial produc-
tion and avoid taxation, but also to circumvent compliance with all manner
of regulations when producing oﬃcially. Finally, although the bribery ques-
tion was worded with reference to “firms in your line of business,” we assume
along with others31 that responses mainly supply information about bribery
at the own-firm level, rather than bribery among comparable firms in various
areas of activity.32 As noted earlier, in view of the weak indirect measure-
ment of eﬀects from μij , Sj and Pj , we expect that that some corruption
price eﬀects will be picked up by Kij because the visibility and detection of
corrupt transactions are likely to increase with firm size.
Measurement of remaining variables in (15) is more straightforward. The
profit tax rate, tFj , is measured by the top marginal tax rate on corporate
profits in each country for year 2000,33 and the payroll taxation, tLj , is
measured by social security contribution rates for year 1999.34 Descriptive
statistics reported in Table 1 show that among variables varying by i and
j, within-country standard deviations are nearly twice the magnitude of the
between-country standard deviations, implying that firm-specific character-
istics aﬀecting those variables are considerably more variable than country-
specific attributes.
3.2 Tax Evasion and Unoﬃcial Production
The WBES data also allow us to test the model’s implications concerning
determinants of the share of output in the oﬃcial/unoﬃcial economy and
tax evasion. Figure 2 and the associated theoretical analysis implied that
the share of taxed, oﬃcial output in total output,
³
yo
yo+yu
´
ij
, declines as the
31See, for example, Johnson, Kaufmann, McMillan, and Woodruﬀ (2000), Batra, Kauf-
mann, and Stone (2002) and Svensson (2003).
32 Interviewers of course could not expect managers to go on record about having en-
gaged in criminal behavior. At least some respondents, however, most likely were in fact
reporting common practice in their area of activity rather than own-firm behavior per se,
and this is a source of measurement error that will tend to depress the magnitudes of
coeﬃcient estimates of regressors based on these data.
33Data are from the World Tax Database maintained by the Ross
School of Business at the University of Michigan and are available at
http://www.bus.umich.edu/otpr/otpr/introduction.htm.
34We added up contributions pertaining to old age, disability and death, sickness and
maternity, work injury, and unemployment. The data mix contributions from employers
and employees in the various payroll systems. The constituent data are from “Social Secu-
rity Programs Throughout the World” available at the US Social Security Administration
web site http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/1999/index.html.Teh
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Analysis Level Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Tax Toleration Firms (3818) overall 1.7 0.99 1 4
(1=Major Obstacle Countries (54) between 0.48
to 4=No Obstacle), tij within 0.87
Institutional Services Firms (3818) overall 2.62 0.74 1 4
(1=Major Obstacle to Countries (54) between 0.38
4=No Obstacle), Bij within 0.65
Labour Regulations Firms (3818) overall 2.73 1.07 1 4
(1=Major Obstacle to Countries (54) between 0.58
4=No Obstacle), RLij within 0.93
Regulations on Oﬃcial Firms (3818) overall 2.94 0.70 1 4
Activity (1=Major Obstacle Countries (54) between 0.34
to 4=No Obstacle), RFij within 0.62
Infrequency of Bribes Firms (3818) overall 4.33 1.62 1 6
(1=Always to 6=Never), Countries (54) between 0.81
(μ, S, P )ij within 1.46
Capital Assets Firms (3818) overall 115,315 201,544 125 500,000
(1000s USD), Kij Countries (54) between 118,265
within 169,236
% Reported Sales Firms (3818) overall 2.1 0.81 1 3
(1=<60% to 3=100%), Countries (54) between 0.39³
yo
yo+yu
´
ij
within 0.73
% Corporate Tax Rate, Countries (54) overall 30.1 6.3 15.0 45.5
tFj
% Payroll Tax Rate, Countries (54) overall 27.5 13.0 4.2 53.0
tLj
Notes: Index i denotes firms and j denotes countries. Theoretical model variables appear
after text labels.
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gap between the tax rate tij and and the level of tax toleration tij increases,
where tij is in turn a function of the exogenous variables on the right-side
of (15). The measurement metrics of tij and tij are incompatible, so direct
computation of tax gaps by
¡
tij − tij
¢
or tij/tij is infeasible. The model
nonetheless implies the following pattern of empirical relations:35
(16)"
+
Bij , tw
Ã
−
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Kij
#
⇒
+
t ij ⇒
t
"
−
tFj ,
+
RFij
#
⇒
µ
yo
yo + yu
¶
ij
We measure the relative scale of oﬃcial production,
³
yo
yo+yu
´
ij
, with re-
sponses to the WBES question “Recognizing the diﬃculties many enterprises
face in fully complying with taxes and regulations, what percentage of total
sales would you estimate the typical firm in your area of activity reports for
tax purposes?.”36 The response options included eight ‘percentage of total
sales’ categories with irregular intervals ranging from ‘0-25% ’ sales reported
up to ‘100% ’ sales reported. We collapsed the responses into three cate-
gories, 1=<60%, 2=60-99% and 3=100%, containing fairly equal relative
frequencies — 28%, 34% and 38% for codes 1, 2 and 3 respectively.37 De-
scriptive statistics in Table 1 indicate that standard deviations around the
mean value of 2.1 are almost twice as high within countries as between — a
pattern similar to the dispersions of other variables varying across firms and
countries. More important, since all firms sampled are legally registered, the
data imply that simultaneous activity in the oﬃcial and unoﬃcial economy
is a relatively common state of aﬀairs.
35The expected signs given for the ‘analogous-to-tax’, regulation variables RLij and RFij
are opposite to those of the conventional tax variables tLj and tFj because the response codes
run from 1=Major Obstacle to 4=No Obstacle, implying that regulatory costs decline with
higher code values.
36As with the irregular ‘additional payments’ (bribery) question discussed above, the
WBES naturally did not ask managers directly to acknowledge criminal behavior, and for
this reason the tax evasion question was phrased with reference to “the typical firm in
your area of activity”. As pointed out before, such questions are commonly interpreted as
revealing firms’ own-behavior.
37The empirical results discussed ahead however were not at all sensitive to this and
other ways of organizing the raw tax evasion data.
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3.3 Regression Experiments
Table 2 reports four ordered logit regression experiments relevant to the
testable implications of the model. All independent variables are in log-
arithms and so regression coeﬃcients estimate the impact of proportional
movements in each variable on the ordered response variables.38
Model (1) investigates the determinants of tax toleration summarized by
equation (15). All determinants of our survey-based measure of tij are highly
significant statistically and have the signs predicted by the underlying theo-
retical model, with the exception of log Payroll Tax Rate which is correctly
signed but has a p-value of 0.07.39 More important, the probability eﬀects
implied by the ordered logit regression coeﬃcients are substantively sizeable.
The biggest eﬀects are generated by the log Institutional Services variable.
Consider, for example, a representative firm experiencing an improvement
of institutional services spanning the full range of lnB (from log 1.0 to log
4.0) when all other variables are equal to their sample means. Standard
computations based on the ordered logit coeﬃcient estimates show that this
maximal improvement in measured lnBij decreases the probability that the
firm will have the lowest tax toleration score (tij = 1) by 0.53 (from 0.90 to
0.37), and increases the probability it will move into the higher tax tolera-
tion categories tij = 2, tij = 3, and tij = 4 by probabilities 0.22, 0.16 and
0.14, respectively. The response of tax toleration to equivalent movements
in other variables in model (1) are smaller than the changes induced by shifts
in lnB in monotonic relation to the relative magnitudes of the ordered logit
coeﬃcient estimates.
Regression experiments (2)-(4) investigate the determinants of the rela-
tive scale of tax evasion — where as noted earlier tax evasion is measured by
interview data on the share of total sales reported to tax authorities. Mod-
els (2) and (3) correspond to the reduced form causal relations sketched in
equation (16). Model (4) is the structural form. In models (3) and (4) in-
dependent variables are interacted with a binary variable LT that isolates
38Regressions based on independent variables expressed in original metrics yield the
same pattern of results, although the semi-elasticity log setups in Table 2 delivered slightly
better chi square significance statistics for the models entertained.
39Recall, however, that the model did not make an unambiguous prediction of the sign
of a firm’s capital stock, Kij . The significant positive coeﬃcient implies that the indirect
eﬀects of Kij dominate the direct eﬀects, but this cannot be taken as evidence one way
or the other of the model’s validity.
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Table 2: Regressions
Dependent Tax Toleration Tax Evasion
Variable: (1=Major Obstacle to (1 if
³
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yo+yu
´
ij
<60% to 3 if
³
yo
yo+yu
´
ij
=100%)
4=No Obstacle), tij
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4)
All Firms Firms with t < 4
log Institutional 1.973 0.741 0.732
Services, lnBij (0.247|0.000) (0.174|0.000) (0.153|0.000)
log Payroll -0.389 0.009 0.006
Tax Rate, lntLj (0.214|0.069) (0.182|0.959) (0.162|0.970)
log Labor 0.703 -0.084 -0.107
Regulations, lnRLij (0.218|0.001) (0.090|0.350) (0.089|0.232)
log Top Corporate -0.331 -0.598 -0.289
Tax Rate, ln tFj (0.364|0.364) (0.183|0.001) (0.100|0.004)
log Regulations on 0.031 -0.002 0.451
Oﬃcial Activity, (0.174|0.861) (0.170|0.992) (0.172|0.009)
lnRFij
log Infrequency 0.352 0.757 0.716
of Bribes, (0.116|0.002) (0.104|0.000) (0.108|0.000)
ln{μ, S, P}ij
log Fixed Assets, 0.103 0.022 0.023
lnKij (0.031|0.001) (0.020|0.280) (0.020|0.250)
log Tax 0.311
Toleration, lntij (0.118|0.009)
Wald χ2 (p-value) 79.58 (0.000) 79. 43 (0.000) 79.23 (0.000) 15.02 (0.002)
N Firms 3818 3818 3818 3818
N Countries 54 54 54 54
Notes: Index i denotes firms and j denotes countries. Estimation Method is Ordered Logit
with Robust Standard Errors. In models (3) and (4) independent variables are interacted
with a “lower tax tolerance” dummy variable LT, where LT=1 if t< 4 and LT=0 if t= 4.
In parentheses (standard error|p-value). Recall that the Regulations variables RLij and
RFij are scored 1=Major Obstacle to 4=No Obstacle and are therefore expected to have
signs opposite to those of the corresponding conventional tax rate variables.
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firms in which taxes pose at least some obstacle to business operations.40 We
take these firms to be ones in which tax toleration t potentially plays a sig-
nificant role in sectoral production decisions, and among them tax rates and
the determinants of tax toleration will likely exhibit comparatively robust
eﬀects on the share of output declared oﬃcially and subject to taxation.
In reduced form Models (2) and (3) the institutional services regressor,
lnBij , and our crude proxy for bribe price eﬀects of μij , Sj and Pj are
significant and substantively sizeable. However, the capital stock term lnKij
and the labor tax variables lnRLij and ln t
L
j are insignificantly diﬀerent from
zero in these test regressions. The results for lnKij , however, say little
about the applicability of the model in data because the direct negative
and indirect positive eﬀects of capital endowments on a firm’s incentive to
produce oﬃcially probably tend to oﬀset one another in reduced form.
As expected, Model (3) delivers results most consistent with the under-
lying theoretical model. The regressors lnBij , ln tj and ln
©
μij , Sj , Pj
ª
are
all highly significant, correctly signed and exert sizeable impact on the rela-
tive scale of tax evasion. For instance, the ordered logit coeﬃcient estimates
imply that an increase in log Institutional Services across its full range raises
the probability that a firm will be active exclusively in the taxable economy
— declaring all sales oﬃcially — by 0.23, while the probability that less than
60% of sales will be oﬃcially declared declines by 0.20 when other variables
are at mean values.41
The theoretical structure summarized in equation (16) asserts that a
firm’s threshold of tax toleration tij encapsulates the eﬀects of the insti-
tutional environment, bureaucratic incentives to engage in corruption, and
other independent variables in Model (1) on a firm’s incentive to remain in
the taxed oﬃcial economy, as opposed to entering the underground economy.
Model (4) estimates directly this structure when the dependent variable is
again the share of total sales reported oﬃcially and subject to taxation. As
implied by the model, the estimates show that when both ln tij and the
40As indicated in the notes to Table 2, LT is a binary value that equals 1 for firms
whose managers gave responses 1 =‘major obstacle’, 2= ‘moderate obstacle’ or 3=‘minor
obstacle’ to the “taxes as an obstacle” survey question that we use to measure tij . Recall
that 91% of the firms in our sample have scores t < 4 and hence LT = 1.
41Although the model pertains to individual enterprises and not national aggregates,
averaging the survey variables within countries yields qualitatively similar relationships.
Across N=54 country averages the correlation of the institutional services and tax toler-
ation variables is .63 and between institutional services and reported sales it is .49.
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profit tax variables ln tFj and lnR
F
ij are included in the ordered logit regres-
sion experiment, upward movements in log tax toleration increase the oﬃcial
share, and movements in the log tax variables imposing higher costs on the
firm decrease the oﬃcial share. Taken together, we interpret the results in
Table 2 as broadly supporting our theoretical model, particularly in view
of the substantial errors of measurement in variables used to calibrate the
underlying theoretical concepts.
4 Concluding Observations
The central implication of theoretical and empirical results in this paper is
that markets for corruption arise and big migrations out of legal produc-
tion into the underground economy take place when large numbers of firms
perceive taxes as not “worth paying” — an unfortunate circumstance that
we summarized in terms of profit taxes imposed on producers in the oﬃcial
economy relative to firms’ thresholds of ‘tax toleration’. Tax toleration is
driven by firm-specific appraisals of the availability, quality and usefulness of
institutional services supporting oﬃcial activities, by taxes and regulations
on oﬃcially employed labor, by the compensation of enforcement authori-
ties, and by the eﬀectiveness of detection and punishment of bureaucratic
malfeasance. Because these determinants diﬀer across firms, tax toleration
and tax evasion vary among producers facing the same rates of conventional
profit taxation and operating in the national institutional environment.
Firms without much intrinsic need of formal institutional services will
likely always be tempted to produce unoﬃcially and evade taxation unless
taxes are negligible, or unless corruption prices are extremely high. The lat-
ter would tend to be the case when enforcement authorities are handsomely
compensated, stand high chances of being caught selling corruption, and are
stringently penalized for any malfeasance discovered. Though government
policy clearly can aﬀect such supply-of-corruption variables, it can do little
to influence the appetite for tax evasion of firms that inherently have little
or no interest in oﬃcial institutional services, no matter how well tuned and
accessible those services might be. Yet such firms are likely to be small
(and in many cases single-person operations, like the home cleaning help
engaged informally by many readers of this paper) and at the margins of
many economies.
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Most big players in an economy potentially take great productive benefit
of formal institutional services, and their propensity to remain in the oﬃcial,
tax-paying sector can therefore be influenced by government eﬀorts to build
and sustain institutions of quality. Firms with substantial intrinsic need of
services will tend to develop high tax toleration, if appropriate institutions
are in place. Government tax policy is then less constrained — with high tax
toleration, relatively high taxes on oﬃcial productive activity may be im-
posed without great fear of inducing a mass exodus of tax-paying producers
into the shadow economy.
Heterogeneity of tax toleration among firms has implications for the ag-
gregate eﬀects of policies targeted on the scale of the shadow economy and
tax evasion. Depending on how many and to what extent firms within a
country have incentive to produce underground and evade taxation, policies
regarding profit taxation and the employment conditions of enforcement
bureaucrats may create trade-oﬀs between containment of tax evasion and
the overall level of economic activity. For instance, strengthening incen-
tives of enforcement oﬃcials to remain honest reduces the equilibrium level
of corruption and tax evasion in the unoﬃcial sector at the cost of lower
total output among evading firms, without aﬀecting the productive activ-
ity of non-evading firms. If the economy is dominated by firms with low
thresholds of tax toleration, then higher bureaucratic salaries and better
corruption detection mechanisms may yield only modest expansion of the
oﬃcial production and a contraction of aggregate output.
The likely eﬀects of policies addressing tax evasion by lowering profit
tax rates are more ambiguous. In developing countries, where many firms
are likely to be small and heavily involved in the unoﬃcial sector, reduction
of profit tax rates will help reduce underground production and increase
national output. Profit taxation policy, however, exerts less impact in coun-
tries where many firms operate on the ‘border’ of their tax tolerance, in
the sense that their tax toleration threshold is lower than but close to the
statutory tax rate. In such cases reductions of profit tax rates will tend to
depress aggregate output.
Our model implies, however, that the trade-oﬀ of a smaller underground
economy at the cost of lower aggregate output does not arise with poli-
cies that aﬀect institutional services and taxes and regulations on oﬃcially
employed labor. These policies influence all firms in the economy because
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they aﬀect the productivity and profitability of factors deployed in oﬃcial
production. Improved institutional benefits, for example, have the advan-
tage of giving evading firms incentive to reduce their unoﬃcial operations,
while also inducing higher levels of output among all firms in the economy,
regardless of their location on the continuum of tax evasion. This theoret-
ical implication may help explain the strong positive correlation between
indicators of institutional quality and estimated levels of total and oﬃcial
aggregate national output reported in many empirical studies.
Our firm-level analysis rightly treated institutional benefits and taxes
as unconnected outside variables. However in the macro political economy
they may be intimately connected, if only because public institutions of high
quality require commensurately large investments of public revenue raised by
taxation.42 In principle, a virtuous circle is possible in which high taxes and
low tax evasion coexist amicably because important producers are anchored
firmly in the oﬃcial economy, supplying the tax revenues required to sustain
well functioning institutions that underpin high toleration of taxation.
References
Batra, G., D. Kaufmann, and A. H. Stone (2002). Voices of
the firms 2000: Investment climate and governance find-
ings of the world business environment survey (WBES).
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wbes/ .
Choi, J. P. and M. Thum (2005). Corruption and the shadow economy.
International Economic Review 46 (3), 817—36.
De Soto, H. (1989). The Other Path. Harper and Row Publishers Inc.,
New York.
Friedman, E., S. Johnson, D. Kaufmann, and P. Zoido-Lobaton (2000).
Dodging the grabbing hand: the determinants of unoﬃcial activity in
69 countries. Journal of Public Economics 76, 459—493.
Johnson, S., D. Kaufmann, J. McMillan, and C. Woodruﬀ (2000). Why
do firms hide? bribes and unoﬃcial activity after communism. Journal
of Public Economics 76 (3), 495—520.
42 Important macro-oriented papers by Loayza (1996) and Friedman et al. (2000) take
note of the endogenous linkage between taxation and institutional quality.
28
Johnson, S., D. Kaufmann, and A. Shleifer (1997). The unoﬃcial economy
in transition. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2, 159—239.
Johnson, S., D. Kaufmann, and P. Zoido-Lobaton (1998). Regulatory
discretion and the unoﬃcial economy. AEA Papers and Proceed-
ings 88 (2), 386—392.
Johnson, S., J. McMillan, and C. Woodruﬀ (2002). Courts and relational
contracts. The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 18 (1),
221—277.
Loayza, N. (1996). The economics of the informal sector: a simple model
and some empirical evidence from latin america. Carnegie Rochester
Conference Series on Public Policy 45, 129—162.
Mookherjee, D. and P. Png (1995). Corruptible law enforcers: How should
they be compensated? Economic Journal 105 (428), 145—159.
Schneider, F. and D. Enste (2000). Shadow economies: Size, causes, and
consequences. Journal of Economic Literature XXXVIII, 77—114.
Schneider, F. and D. Enste (2002). The Shadow Economy. An Interna-
tional Survey. Cambridge University Press.
Shleifer, A. and R. W. Vishny (1993). Corruption. The Quarterly Journal
of Economics 108 (August), 599—617.
Svensson, J. (2003). Who must pay bribes and how much? evidence from
a cross section of firms. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (1),
207—31.
29
